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tions with him.I. Introduction*
Restructuring the economy of the five East German states
surely needs a helping hand from the federal budget. Infra-
structure in the former GDR is in poor shape, productive
capacities are in a wretched condition, product-lines are
not adapted to world-market demand, and the labour force is
lacking experience with modern technologies. Since these
deficiencies are the legacy of more than five decades of
central planning (first fascism, then communism) the most
appropriate remedy is establishing a viable market economy.
It is open to doubt, however, if mere market forces are able
to solve the whole bunch of problems.
A clear-cut market solution would require a wage differen-
tial between East and West Germany that completely compen-
sates for efficiency differences of any kind. Considering
the expectations and hopes that were raised by German uni-
fication and considering the low barriers to westward
migration it seems rather unlikely that East German workers
would be ready to accept such a low level of wages. If real
wages fail to adjust to productivity, the "Mezzogiorno
syndrome" could be round the corner, i.e. the former GDR
could be stuck with regional underdevelopment and structural
unemployment for decades (Burda, 1990).
It is the central question of this paper which type of
governmental intervention should be preferred in order to
improve the economic performance of East Germany. For this
purpose part II presents some empirical evidence on the
position of the East German economy since currency unifica-
* This paper was presented at the conference "Economic As-
pects of German Unification", held by the American Insti-
tute for Contemporary German Studies/The Johns Hopkins
University in Washington, D.C., November 13th-14th, 1990.
Helpful comments and suggestions from conference partici-
pants - above all Professor George M. von Fuerstenberg -
are gratefully acknowledged.
For a detailed analysis of the weakness of the East German
economy see Siebert (1990) .- 2 -
tion with West Germany in July 1990 as compared to the
preceding period. The analysis mainly focuses on labour
market problems, especially on the rise in unemployment.
Part III investigates the impact of different forms of
government support on labour demand in the framework of
neoclassical production theory. In addition, it presents a
survey of policy measures that have already been adopted by
the German government. Part IV summarizes and briefly
comments on policy options.
II. The East German economy in transition
The conversion from a centrally planned economy to a market
economy in the GDR came in four separate steps:
- The opening of the Berlin Wall on 9th October 1989 removed
the barriers to migration between East and West Germany.
Since the legal authorities of West Germany had always
regarded East German people as German citizens, the whole
West German labour market was open to them without any
institutional barrier. Up to mid 1990 the West German
government even provided special financial assistance for
people coming from East Germany.
- Since the general East German election of 18th March 1990
the GDR was no longer governed by the Communist Party. The
new coalition of Conservatives and Social Democrats quick-
ly abandoned the search for a "third way" and was deter-
mined to adopt the political and economic system of West
Germany.
- On 1st July 1990 an almost complete economic unification
was achieved. The treaty between the East German and the
West German Government not only included currency unifica-
tion but also the endorsement of a substantial part of
West German business laws to the East German territory.- 3 -
- On 3rd October 1990 economic unification was complemented
by political unification. The joining of East Germany to
the jurisdiction of the West German Basic Law automatic-
ally extended the range of validity of all West German
laws to the East German territory. Specific modifications
were stipulated for a few cases only, for instance in the
areas of environmental protection, antitrust policies and
labour market regulations.
Of course, these steps are only prerequisites for establish-
ing a market economy. The main unsolved issues are the
clarification of property rights on real estate, the pri-
vatization of state-owned enterprises and the reduction and
transformation of an oversized public administration
(Schnabel, 1990; Schmieding, 1990; Siebert, Schmieding,
1990). At present, it seems most urgent to remove these
impediments to the inflow of western capital and technology.
But even under these restraints, it could have been expected
that releasing an economy from central planning would result
in an immediate increase of output, productivity and wealth.
Removing bureaucratic slack and ceasing price and quantity
controls should improve economic efficiency from one day to
the next even without any reconstruction of the capital
stock or the introduction of new technologies. In reality
industrial production in the GDR region fell by half and
unemployment (including short-time work) increased to more
2
than one quarter of the total labour force (Figure 1).
For a careful and illuminating evaluation of the determi-
nants of low efficiency in centrally planned economies see
Winiecki (1988).
2
There is an intense discussion about the question whether
short-time workers should be added to the unemployed for
calculating the true rate of unemployment. It must be
recognized that the conditions for receiving short-time
benefits from the Federal Institution of Labour are sub-
stantially weaker for the GDR region than for the West
German region. In fact, for many East German enterprises
short-time work is just another form of dismissal and many
short-time workers are working zero hours a day. More
detailed statistics on unemployment and short-time work
are presented in Table Al in the appendix.- 4 -
Figure 1 - Unemployment, Short-Time Work and Industrial
Production in the (Former) GDR 1990













Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct
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Source: Statistisches Amt der DDR (1990).
The whole size of labour market problems is even underesti-
mated by these figures. About half a million people
(6 per cent of the labour force) accepted pre-retirement
that is offered to workers who are older than 55 years and
younger than the regular retirement age of 65 years
(Institut fur Angewandte Wirtschaftsforschung, 1990). An
unknown number of workers from public institutions have been- 5 -
suspended from work while their salaries are granted for an
additional period of six or nine months (depending on age).
Moreover, several people, especially women, totally re-
treated from the active labour force. And, last not least,
about half a million workers from the former GDR are now
working in the western part of Germany. Hence, the decrease
in the number of jobs is- much sharper than the increase in
unemployment.
Sure enough, nobody had expected a soft landing of the East
German economy. But for most observers the extent and the
rapidness of decline came as a surprise. In part the dis-
missal of workers simply reflects a shift from covert to
overt unemployment. Under the system of central planning
there were only limited incentives for reducing labour input
and it was almost impossible for enterprises to get rid of
idle workers. In addition many working hours were lost due
to shortage of inputs and other forms of inefficient plann-
ing. Recent estimates based on questionnaires are indicating
that "disguised unemployment" in the GDR reached a level of
about 15 per cent in past years (Vogler-Ludwig, 1990).
Discharging these people will probably continue to fuel open
unemployment for a considerable time. It should be kept in
mind that this type of adjustment by definition only affects
labour input and cannot explain the reduction in output.
An increase in unemployment may also result from asymmetries
in the adjustment speed of ailing and prospering industries.
By and large, central planners in the GDR (and in other
CMEA-countries as well) were favouring raw-material inten-
sive and smokestack industries at the expense of light
industries and services (Stehn, Schmieding, 1990; Kostrzewa,
1988; Weiss, 1983). Since July 1990, liberalization of
prices and strengthened budget-constraints imposed a strong
pressure for structural adjustment on traditional indus-
tries. In part, these pressures showed up in shifting rela-
For a comparison of the sectoral structure of East and
West Germany see Halstrick-Schwenk, Lobbe, Wenke (1990).- 6 -
tive consumer prices after currency unification with West
Germany (Table 1). It should be recognized, however, that
shifts in producer prices were much more distinct, since
subsidies and product-specific levies have also been
removed.
The argument of asymmetric adjustment speed simply says that
less time is required for closing down obsolete activities
than for expanding promising new activities. The available
data on industrial production are suggesting, however, that
the decline of output is not an industry-specific phenome-
non. Within the manufacturing sector there is not a single
industry with an increase of production in August 1990
compared to June 1990 or to the average of 1989 (Table 2).
as
1
Table 1 - Absolute and Relative Price Changes in the GDR

































(a) Absolute price change in the respective expenditure
category divided by change of total consumer prices.
Source: Deutsche Bundesbank (1990); own calculations.
The comparably good performance of water supply can mainly
be attributed to the fact that this sector is still subsi-
dized and not yet exposed to competition.- 7 -









































































































































Source: Statistisches Amt der DDR (1990).
Hence, the East German industry is facing a global problem,
not a sectorally concentrated one. This is not to say that
no sector-specific output reductions are required, but at
present they are obviously outweighed by economy-wide
depression.
For the economy as a whole it is estimated in the joint
forecast of the five leading institutes for economic re-
search that real GDP will be 17 per cent lower in 1990 than
in 1989 (see Deutsches Institut fur Wirtschaftsforschung et
al., 1990, p. 46). These figures are annual averages, i.e.
the estimate for 1990 also includes the first two quarters
when output was rather stable. No monthly or quarterly data
For 1991, a further decline of 10 per cent is predicted.- 8 -
on real GDP of the GDR region are available, but it can be
expected that the decline in the third quarter was much
sharper than in the whole year on average. Nevertheless,
most observers agree that adjustment pressure is strongest
in manufacturing industries.
It could be objected that the decline in output is simply a
statistical phenomenon - at least in part. Up to June 1990,
the GDR was still a centrally planned economy, even if the
plans were observed only to a limited extent. As premiums
and gratuities mainly depended on reported output, it paid
to blow up production statistics by fictions output that was
never produced. This practice is commonly called "Pripiski",
the Russian word for writing down in addition (Winiecki,
1990). Since July 1990, the incentives for Pripiski disap-
peared because the revenues of companies now depended on
factual sales and not on reported production.
Notwithstanding these considerations, there is no doubt that
East German enterprises suffer from insufficient competi-
tiveness in open markets. Up to November 1989 East German
consumers had no choice and even after the break-down of the
Wall their choice was limited by the non-convertibility of
the GDR currency. East German enterprises were still able,
therefore, to sell low quality at high prices. As an immedi-
ate reaction to currency unification, however, retail trade
in the GDR almost totally replaced GDR products by imports
from West Germany or other western countries - literally
overnight.
For most producers of consumer goods this strong demand re-
action was an unexpected shock. They had been well aware of
partial demand shifts, but not of an almost complete plunge
of their sales. Declining demand rapidly diffused to pro-
ducers of intermediate and investment goods. Moreover, their
customers too faced enriched choices and often preferred to
purchase western products.- 9 -
Figure 2 - Evaluation of Inventories in Wholesale and
Retail Trade of the GDR, July 1990
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Source: Ifo-Institut fur Wirtschaftsforschung, Institut fur
angewandte Wirtschaftsforschung (1990).
The situation after currency unification is reflected in the
stock of inventories in wholesale and retail trade (Figure
2): In July 1990 retail trade would have preferred higher
inventories while wholesale trade inventories were judged as
being too high. A shift of inventories between these two
branches was impossible since retail trade was mainly
demanding western products and wholesale trade was offering
eastern products. It has been argued that the resulting dif-
ficulties for eastern producers have been aggravated by
monopolistic behaviour of western trade companies. There is
some casual evidence that West German suppliers tried to tie
GDR shops exclusively to their products. It must be recog-
nized, however, that most GDR consumers highly welcomed the- 10 -
opportunity of spending their new money on those products
that had not been available to them before.
East German producers reacted to declining demand in a quite
market-oriented manner: In July 1990 producer prices were
cut by 48.3 per cent as compared to the average level in
1989. Nominal factor prices, by contrast, even increased.
Government levies for investment funds were substituted by
interest rates, and nominal wages increased by about
2 35 per cent on average. Hence, East German companies are
now facing a significantly deteriorated cost price ratio.
There are also some signs of hope, especially from the es-
tablishment of new enterprises in the service sector (Ta-
ble 3). In the past, central planners had almost ignored
this part of the economy and its share in total employment
remained at a level of about 40 per cent, whereas the
corresponding share in western industrial countries was
60 per cent or even higher. In the future, expanding service
industries will probably absorb the majority of workers that
are dismissed from manufacturing. In the short and medium
run, however, the buoyancy of services seems much too weak
for bearing the whole burden of labour market problems.
Some economists are primarily attributing rising unemploy-
ment to the conversion rate of 1:1 that was chosen for cur-
rency unification with West Germany. They would have pre-
ferred a substantially lower rate for the Mark of the GDR in
order to keep real wages down (see, e.g., Vaubel, 1990). It
can be doubted, however, that a less favourable conversion
rate would have substantially improved the competitiveness
of East German companies.
From the theory of optimum currency areas it is well known
that a real depreciation is impossible between currencies of
See Bundesministerium fur Wirtschaft (1990).
2
Sachverstandigenrat (1990).- 11 -








































































Source: Statistisches Amt der DDR (1990).
countries with a high factor mobility. If the nominal value
of one currency is reduced, the outflow of capital and
labour will quickly drive up nominal factor prices. With
perfect factor mobility the increase in nominal factor
prices will just offset the decrease in nominal exchange
rates, i.e. real exchange rates will remain stable.
In fact, the political motivation for a conversion rate of
1:1 was exactly the intention to stop or at least slow down
migration from East to West Germany. The events since 9th
One of the most popular slogans on East German rallies in
early 1990 ran as follows: If the D-Mark does not come to
us, we shall come to the D-Mark.- 12 -
November 1989 had clearly demonstrated that the mobility of
labour between the two Germanies was much higher than, say,
between Germany and Spain or other low-wage regions of the
EC. Admittedly, in the first days after the breakdown of the
Wall many East Germans came to the West for political rea-
sons, since the credibility of the new freedom to move was
far from clear. In the course of- spring 1990, however, eco-
nomic motives for migration increasingly dominated.
It must be noticed, therefore, that the two German govern-
ments did not have the choice of determining the price ratio
between East and West Germany by fixing a more or less
favourable conversion rate for currency unification. With no
barriers to trade and migration, output and factor price ra-
tios between East and West are determined by market forces,
not by government treaties. Economic policies that are de-
signed at restructuring the East German economy must accept
as a fact that prices of East German products sharply
declined and factor prices moved up. There is no way of
reversing these events.
III. Criteria for evaluating different types of government
support
In the context of neoclassical production theory all price
adjustments that occurred in East Germany can be interpreted
as an increase in real factor prices. From the producers'
viewpoint a deterioration of output prices is equivalent to
an increase of factor prices. The basic features of the
changed situation are illustrated by Figure 3, showing a
production function that relates different levels of capital
intensity (k) to different levels of labour productivity
(y). Before entering the details it should be carefully ex-
amined how to interpret the concept of a production function
The changing political situation in the GDR since 1989 is
analyzed by Hamilton (1990).- 13 -
Bibliofhsk
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Figure 3 - Production Function, Factor Prices and Subsidies
W.
W
for the former GDR. In traditional growth models interna-
tional factor mobility is in general ruled out; the produc-
tion function describes the productive capacities of a coun-
try with given factor endowment and technology. Hence, fac-
tor intensity is exogenous and the factor price ratio is en-
dogenous .
Such a model does obviously not apply to East Germany after
the breakdown of the Wall. Factor prices rather than factor
intensities are exogenously determined, notably by prices
that prevail in West Germany. In this situation, the produc-
tion function of Figure 3 simply describes the state of
technology that is available in the eastern part of the Ger-
man economy.- 14 -
Real interest rates (determined on world capital markets)
are given by the shape of the straight lines running through
points A and C, and w- is the level of real wages that would
enable East German companies to compete on world markets. If
wages were lower, competition among producers would drive
them up; if wages were higher, fixed capital would be dis-
tracted from the region and unemployment (or emigration)
would steadily rise. Economic stability can only be achieved
at a wage level of w1, and this level automatically leads to
full employment.
Unfortunately, w. is not feasible, since it would not be ac-
cepted by the labour force. Real wages in West Germany are
much higher and w1 is often even lower than social security
1
 1
payments. Instead, East German producers have to accept a
real wage of w_.
The most comfortable way out of this dilemma would be an in-
crease of productivity that corresponds to the increase in
real wages, i.e. an upward shift of the production function
until it touches the straight line running through wo and C.
In the long run, such an increase can be expected from the
inflow of western capital and from technological cooperation
between eastern and western companies. At present, however,
technology transfer is strongly hampered by uncertainties on
property rights on real estate, by slow and bureaucratic de-
cisions on privatization by the Treuhand-Anstalt, by idle
transport and telecommunication facilities, and - last not
least - by a qualification of the labour force that is not
2
adapted to western technologies. In the long run, these
Since July 1990, East German citizens are entitled to re-
ceive the same amount of social aid as West Germans, with
some adjustments only for the lower level of rents in East
Germany. The social security system hence fixes de facto
minimum wages for East Germany (and West Germany as well).
2
For an analysis of the qualification requirements in East
Germany see Klodt (1990).- 15 -
problems will probably disappear, but it must be recognized
that the East German economy right now faces a significant
transition period with severe labour market distortions.
There is some need, therefore, for temporary government as-
sistance.
The appropriateness of specific types of, government inter-
vention can be evaluated by four criteria:
(a) The adopted measures should be effective, i.e. they
should increase aggregate demand for labour.
(b) They should be temporary, i.e. labour demand should re-
main high when government support will be gradually re-
duced in the course of the transition period.
(c) They should be fast-working, i.e. they should increase
labour demand at early stages of the transition period
when unemployment problems are most severe.
(d) They should be efficient, i.e. they should yield the
desired result at minimum costs.
There is a broad variety of possible forms of government in-
tervention. If the economic situation of East Germany is
correctly described by Figure 3, however, they can be clas-
sified into three basic categories: A first type of measures
aims at shifting the production function upwards by increas-
ing overall economic efficiency, for instance by modernizing
infrastructure or by public investment in the qualification
of the labour force.
A second (and commonly used) type of measures reduces the
user's costs of capital, in general by public grants or tax
credits for private fixed capital formation. As these meas-
The five leading institutes of West Germany are expecting
that the extreme point of depression in East Germany will
be reached in summer 1991 (see Deutsches Institut fur
Wirtschaftsforschung et al., 1990).- 16 -
ures are basically equivalent to an interest rate subsidy,
they can be illustrated in Figure 2 by a downward twist of
the line connecting w_ and C to the line connecting w2 and
B. A third type of measures that reduces the producer's
costs of labour input by subsidizing wages would bring this
line down to the one running through w1 and A.
All of these measures comply with the above stated criterion
(a), since they increase the profitability of economic ac-
tivity and hence increase aggregate demand for labour. With
respect to criterion (b) , however, type-one measures are to
be preferred against type-two and type-three measures, since
improvements of infrastructure and qualification will raise
economic efficiency and thus help to close the gap between
real wages and productivity. After closing the gap no fur-
ther subsidies will be needed. To some extent, subsidizing
factor prices will also increase productivity by stimulating
investment in new jobs. These investment activities will
introduce modern capital-embodied technologies into the GDR
region and hence shift the production function upwards.
Hence, the amount of factor price subsidies that is neces-
sary for sustaining full employment will gradually decline
in the course of time. Nevertheless, the upward shift of the
production function will be more rapid with type-one meas-
ures, since they are directly improving economic efficiency.
Unfortunately, type-one measures are inferior to the others
concerning criterion (c), i.e. their positive impact on
labour demand will not immediately show up. One can easily
understand, therefore, why the two German governments decid-
ed to emphasize cost-reducing measures against efficiency-
It has been suggested that strict price controls on non-
tradables should be preferred to direct wage subsidies,
since residence decisions of rational workers would depend
on real and not on nominal wages (Burda, 1990). It might
be agreed that low rents and low tariffs for public trans-
port would give an incentive for staying in the GDR re-
gion, but freezing these prices at present low levels
would severely discourage the modernization of the East
German housing stock and transport facilities.- 17 -
increasing ones. At present, government support for recon-
structing and modernizing infrastructure and for improving
the qualification of the labour force are only a small
fraction of total subsidies to the former GDR.
Within the area of cost-reducing subsidies there is an un-
equivocal order of preference between interest rate and wage
subsidies with regard to criterion (d). In Figure 3, the
wage subsidy per head that is necessary to achieve full em-
ployment is equal to the distance w.. wo. The corresponding
interest rate subsidy per head is given by the distance BC.
With any neoclassical production function BC is larger than
w1w_. It can be concluded, therefore, that a given increase
in labour demand can be achieved by a less amount of wage
subsidies than of interest rate subsidies.
The difference simply arises from the fact that wage subsi-
dies are directly adjusting labour costs to labour produc-
tivity, whereas interest rate subsidies are indirectly clos-
ing the gap between wages and productivity by raising capi-
tal-labour ratio. In other words: part of interest rate sub-
sidies are utilized for increasing the capital intensity of
existing jobs and not for creating new jobs. Of course,
interest rate subsidies would result in higher levels of
labour productivity and total output, but it must be recog-
nized that wage subsidies will attain full-employment at
lower costs.
An evaluation of actual economic policy for restructuring
the economy of eastern Germany in light of these criteria is
quite difficult because there is a manifold and rapidly
increasing collection of different government programmes.
They are in general not documented in easily available
publications and relevant information is scattered over
numerous leaflets, booklets and newspaper articles. A selec-
In this context, the term neoclassical refers to diminish-
ing returns.1 Q
J. O
tion of the most important cost-reducing programmes is
presented in Tables A2 and A3 in the appendix.
A brief glance at these tables clearly indicates that the
majority of programmes is concerned to fixed capital forma-
tion, whereas subsidization of labour costs is of minor im-
portance. This impression is confirmed by a comparison of
financial volumes; the programmes listed in Table A3 are in
general less expensive than those of Table A2. There exists,
however, one important exception - payments for short-time
work. This is the most expensive one among the government
programmes in support of the GDR region.
It should be noted, however, that these payments do not ex-
actly fit into the above described categories of efficiency-
increasing or cost-reducing subsidies. Payments for short-
time workers are not increasing labour demand but are simply
preventing dismissal. The government intends to combine
short-time payments with qualification measures, but the
available evidences suggest that most short-time workers of
eastern Germany are simply disguised unemployed.
IV. Prospects for economic policy
The sharp recession in East Germany mainly arises from the
widened gap between real wages and labour productivity. As
the barriers to migration between East and West Germany have
disappeared, a significant rise in the level of wages was
inevitable. A corresponding rise in productivity is hampered
by various factors, notably by unsolved questions about
property rights on real estate, by sluggish decentralization
and privatization of state-owned companies and by defi-
ciencies in infrastructure and qualification. Closing the
productivity gap will probably take several years.- 19 -
The central issue in economic policy is to remove these
impediments to the reconstruction of the East German economy
in order to retrench the transition period. In face of
rapidly increasing unemployment, however, it seems inevi-
table to direct at least part of government funds towards
mitigating the transition problems. Government support for
sustaining labour demand should be effective, temporary,
fast-working and efficient.
It is a fundamental problem for policy makers that efficien-
cy-increasing measures are in general not fast-working and
that cost-reducing measures tend to turn into ever-lasting
subsidies. The German government responded to this trade-off
by presenting a mixture of different programmes. A critical
evaluation of these programmes should acknowledge that
economic policy resisted the temptation of designing inter-
ventionistic subsidy programmes for the support of specific
industries. The government does not pretend to know the
winners of tomorrow and almost all programmes are open to
any branch of the economy.
It can be criticized, however, that public funds are heavily
concentrated on the promotion of fixed capital formation. In
light of neoclassical production theory, reducing unemploy-
ment by subsidizing labour costs would be cheaper. It might
be objected that the concept of the production function
would be somewhat strained when drawing the policy conclu-
sion that subsidies on capital input should totally be
replaced by temporary subsidies on labour input. For
instance, it could be argued that it may be more difficult
for political reasons to get rid of wage subsidies when the
transition period is over. Nevertheless, the analysis
presented above should cast at least some doubts on the
present approach of the German federal government that
completely ignores the alternative of subsidizing wages.- 20 -
Finally, the problems of improving the qualification of the
labour force are not solved at all. It has been analyzed
elsewhere that many workers from East Germany are lacking
experience with modern technologies (Klodt, 1990). According
to official announcements, the system of short-time benefits
is intended to solve this problem by combining short-time
work with qualification arrangements wherever possible. The
central problem is, however, that those who want to get
short-time payments are forced to stay in their old
companies. And very often these old companies are unable to
provide new qualifications. It should be considered, hence,
to substitute short-time payments by personal grants that
can also be used for qualification programmes outside old
companies.- 21 -
























































































































Source: Statistisches Amt der DDR (1990).- 22 -
Table A2 - Selected Measures for Promoting Fixed Capital
Formation in the Five New States
Measure Duration
Investment grant for equipment
(until 30.06.91: 12 %; until 30.06.92: 8 %)
Special depreciation for equipment purchased in
1990 (50 %; 30 %; 20 %)
Two-year exemption from personal and corporate
income tax up to 10 000 DM for enterprises
established before 01.01.91
Additional grant for building society deposi-
tors (unmarried: 1 200 DM; couples: 2 400 DM)
Creation of appropriations for tangible assets
transferred to companies in the (former) GDR
and for initial losses of affiliates in the
(former) GDR
Investment grant (up to 23 %) from the joint
programme "Improvement of regional industry
structure" (total grants of 3 billion DM per
year; jointly financed by the federal govern-
ment and the five new states)
Investment grant (up to 90 %) for business-
related municipal infrastructure
Low-interest credits for municipal investment
(credit volume: 10 billion DM, interest rate
reduction: up to 3 % for 10 years)
ECCS-credits for investment in mining regions
of the (former) GDR
Disbursement credits for modernizing houses and
flats (credit volume: 10 billion DM; maximum
individual amount: 10 000 DM)
Promotion of equity capital of SMEs (low-inter-
est credits up to 40 % of investment expendi-
tures)
ERP-credits for establishment of new enter-
prises, modernization of enterprises a. invest-
ment in environmental protection (credit vol-
ume 1990: 7.5 billion DM; 1991: 6 billion DM;
















Investment-credits of the Deutsche Ausgleichs-
bank (max. individual amount: 1.5 million DM)
Guarantees for liquid loans (80 % of credit
volume, up to the liquidity requirements for
3 months)
Payment guarantees for West German deliverers
(80 % of deliveries guaranteed by the federal
government)
ERP-credits for private investment in the
(former) GDR (50 % share of the finance; maxi-
mum individual amount: 1 million DM)
Programme for promoting tourism (low-interest
credits for establishing, expanding and modern-
izing hotels and restaurants)
Low-interest credits of the KfW for modernizing
houses and flats (credit volume: 10 billion DM;







Table A3 - Selected Measures for Promoting the Employment of
Labour in the Five New States
Short-time payments also for non-temporary loss of working hours
(limited until 30.06.91; can be extended until 31.12.95)
Access to qualification programmes also for workers who are not
unemployed
Grants and credits to enterprises for promoting comencement of
work
Bridge-over financing for founders of new enterprises (equivalent
to unemployment benefits for up to six months)
Job-creating measures of private and public institutions (finan-
cial contribution to wages and salaries between 50 % and 100 %;
regular duration: 1 year; maximum duration: 3 years)
Promotion of external institution for qualification and technology
transfer (financial contribution to investment up to 90 %)
Promotion of arrangements for information and qualification
(financial contribution to arrangement costs)
Promotion of consulting services for SMEs
(80 % of consulting fees, maximum individual amount: 3 000 DM)- 25 -
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